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ABSTRACT 
 
The literature exploring other regarding behavior sheds important light on interesting social 
phenomena, yet less attention has been given to how the received results speak to 
foundational assumptions within economics. Our study synthesizes the empirical evidence, 
showing that recent work challenges convex preference theory but is largely consistent 
with rational choice theory. Guided by this understanding, we design a new, more 
demanding test of a central tenet of rational choice—the Contraction Axiom—within a 
sharing framework. Making use of more than 300 dictators participating in a series of 
allocation games, we show that sharing choices violate the Contraction Axiom. We 
advance a new theory of moral reference points that augments standard models to explain 
our experimental data. Beyond capturing the data patterns in our experiment, our theory 
also organizes the broader sharing patterns in the received literature and has applications 
to strategic games with contractions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most influential bodies of economics research in the past two decades revolves around 
whether and to what extent people value efficiency, fairness, equity, and reciprocity. Experimental 
work has provided evidence that such motivations can be important in creating and determining 
surplus allocations in markets (see, e.g., Fehr et al., 1993; Bandiera et al., 2005; Landry et al., 
2010; Cabrales et al., 2010; Hertz and Taubinsky, 2017), with accompanying theoretical models 
of social preferences providing a framework to rationalize such behaviors (see, e.g., Rabin, 1993; 
Charness and Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton 
and Ockenfels, 2000; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj, 2008; Fudenberg 
and Levine, 2012; Bourles et al., 2017; Celen et al., 2017; Galperti and Strulovici, 2017).  
Within this line of research, a class of experiments is used to measure pro-social 
preferences, with typical experiments taking the form of dictator games, gift exchange games, 
public goods games, ultimatum games, and trust games. While such games have shown that social 
preferences touch many areas of economic interactions, what is largely missing is a deeper 
understanding of whether individual choices violate deeply held economic tenets. At this point, it 
is too early to conclude definitively, but the received literature suggests that observed sharing 
behaviors are consonant with neoclassical theory. For instance, in a seminal study, Andreoni and 
Miller (2002) show that in a modified dictator game subjects’ choices satisfy the key axiom of 
revealed preference theory.1  More recently, Andersen et al. (2011) provide data that reveals 
demand curves for fairness in an ultimatum game are downward sloping. While in its infancy, this 
work suggests that certain sharing behaviors can be captured by the standard economic model. 
 The shortage of work testing basic tenets in the sharing literature contrasts sharply with 
other areas of behavioral economics, which have lent deep insights into foundational assumptions 
within economics. For example, for riskless choice, received results reveal that many consumers 
have preferences defined over changes in consumption, but individual behavior converges to the 
neoclassical prediction as trading experience intensifies (see, e.g., Kahneman et al., 1990; List, 
2004; Engelmann and Hollard, 2010).  
Relatedly, for choice that involves risk, several scholars (see, e.g., Harless, 1992; Hey, 
1995; and Hey and Orme, 1994) present econometric estimates of indifference curves under risk 
at the individual level that show neither expected utility theory nor the non-expected utility 
                                                 
1 Fisman et al. (2007) extend this earlier work by developing an experimental framework that allows the researcher 
to not only test the consistency of choices but also recover individual level preferences for giving. Fisman et al. 
(2015) explore how preferences for giving are impacted by macroeconomic shocks. 
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alternatives do a satisfactory job of organizing behavior. Choi et al. (2007) extend this analysis by 
developing an experimental protocol that allows the researcher to both test the consistency of 
choices with the assumption of utility maximization and estimate a two-parameter utility function 
for each individual. These examples are not exhaustive, as there are many other active research 
inquiries in this spirit, including those exploring intertemporal choice (see, e.g., Laibson, 1997; 
O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999, 2001; Frederick et al., 2002), asymmetry and transitivity of 
preferences (Tversky, 1969; Slovic 1995; Cox and Grether, 1996; List, 2002), and conditional 
altruism (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008). 
Our study follows the spirit of this broader literature by exploring whether basic economic 
tenets are satisfied in sharing choices as observed in the dictator game, which has emerged as a 
workhorse in the social science literature. Recently, to understand more deeply the factors that 
motivate sharing, a number of scholars have augmented the standard dictator game by varying the 
feasible action set (e.g., List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008; Cappelen, et al., 2013). These studies report 
that dictators change their allocations in interesting ways when presented a chance to take as well 
as to give to others. For example, in the typical dictator game the experiment is framed such that 
“giving nothing” is the least generous act, and substantial sums of money are given away (Engel, 
2011). Yet, research shows that if subjects are allowed to give or take money from the other player, 
they give much less to the other player on average. 
The first goal of our study is to step back from the burgeoning literature and attempt to 
synthesize what we have learned theoretically from the experimental exercises of List (2007) and 
others. We explain that the traditional dictator game, wherein more than 60 percent of dictators 
pass a positive amount of money, is consistent with neoclassical convex preference theory (Hicks, 
1946; Samuelson, 1947). Yet, more recent results from this literature (e.g., List, 2007; Bardsley, 
2008; Cappelen, et al., 2013) provide evidence that challenges convex preference theory. 
Nevertheless, these new data are largely consistent with rational choice theory (Sen, 1971).  
Our second goal is to build on the experimental literature by conducting a dictator game 
experiment that generates a stark test of a foundational assumption within economics: the 
Contraction Axiom.2  For singleton choice sets, the Contraction Axiom (Chernoff, 1954) is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for a choice function to be rationalizable by a complete and 
                                                 
2 For singleton choice sets, the Contraction Axiom states that if x is chosen from feasible set F then it will also be 
chosen from any contraction of set F that contains x.   
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transitive ordering (Sen, 1971).3  To test whether this central theoretical condition holds, we 
present an experiment with dictator games in which we systematically vary both the feasible set 
and the actions available to the dictator.4  Designing an experiment that preserves the feasible set 
but allows dictator giving or taking provides one type of test of the Contraction Axiom. This 
important design departure from the List (2007) and Bardsley (2008) work makes it possible for 
us to explore rational choice theory at a deeper level. Furthermore, by preserving the initial 
endowment but contracting the feasible set, we depart from recent literature on effects of social 
norms on play in dictator games (Krupka and Weber, 2013; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2015). 
Unlike this related work, our design allows discrimination between the effects on choices of initial 
endowments from the effects of contracting feasible sets while preserving endowments, which 
turns out to be crucial to discriminating between rational choice theory (the Contraction Axiom) 
and its special case, convex preference theory. 
The experimental data yields several insights. First, we find that our subjects – students at 
Georgia State University - exhibit patterns of giving and taking behavior similar to other university 
students (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008; Korenok, Millner, and Razzolini, 2014) and to a 
representative sample of Danish adults (Cappelen, et al., 2013). In particular, contracting the 
feasible set to remove taking options causes subjects to provide higher payoffs to recipients and 
keep less for themselves. Second, and most importantly, in our experiment such contraction causes 
subjects to keep more for themselves even when the contracted set contains the originally-chosen 
allocation, which is inconsistent with the Contraction Axiom and therefore at odds with extant 
rational choice theory. Crucially, combined with previous results, our data suggest how rational 
choice theory can be modified to explain the overall behavioral patterns.  
This deeper understanding leads to the third goal of our study: to develop an axiomatic 
foundation for other-regarding behavior and test empirical validity of the new axiomatic theory 
with data from our own experiment and from previous work.5 Our theoretical development follows 
the approach in Cox and Sadiraj (2010) to extend choice theory to accommodate dictator game 
data that violates a central tenet of conventional theory – in this case, the Contraction Axiom. The 
key component of our theory is the identification of moral reference points that are observable 
                                                 
3 For set-valued choice functions, rationality is equivalent to Sen’s (1971) Properties α and β (see below). Property α 
is the Contraction Axiom.  
4 In this paper, we have elected to use “action set” to refer to actions of taking or giving whereas “feasible set” 
denotes the conventional set of feasible allocations, i.e., it is ordered pairs of dictator’s and recipient’s payoffs.  
5 See also experiments by Grossman and Eckel, 2015, Engel, 2011; Korenok et al., 2013; Korenok et al., 2014; 
Zhang and Ortmann, 2014.  
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features of the environment, i.e., feasible sets and initial endowments.6  We view our study as 
fitting in nicely with the “theory speaking to experiment and experiment speaking to theory” 
research culture that has permeated experimental economics for decades.  
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the design of our 
experiment and the procedures. Section 3 discusses the implications of extant theory and develops 
our axiomatic theory incorporating moral reference points. Section 4 presents our experimental 
results. Section 5 presents implications of our theory for related experiments in Andreoni and 
Miller (2002), Korenok, et al. (2014), Krupka and Weber (2013), and Lazear, Malmendier, and 
Weber (2012). Section 6 explains how our theory can be applied to strategic games with 
contractions and presents applications to moonlighting and investment games and to carrot/stick, 
carrot, and stick games.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. BACKGROUND, DESIGN, AND PROTOCOL  
Kahneman et al. (1986) was the first to conduct a dictator game experiment in economics, giving 
subjects a hypothetical choice of choosing an even split of $20 ($10 each) with an anonymous 
subject or an uneven split ($18, $2), favoring themselves. Three-quarters of the subjects opted for 
the equal split. The wheels were set in motion for three decades of research examining sharing and 
allocation of surplus in the lab and field. One stylized result that has emerged from the large 
literature is that more than 60 percent of subjects pass a positive amount to their anonymous 
partners, and conditional on a positive transfer, roughly 20 percent of the endowment is passed.  
 Even though some scholars have argued that such giving patterns violate deeply held 
economic doctrines, it is important to recall that preference order axioms do not uniquely identify 
the commodity bundles. In a two-commodity case, my preferences may be defined over my 
hotdogs and my hamburgers. But the same formal theory of preferences can be applied to two 
commodities identified as my hamburgers and your hamburgers. Identification of the commodities 
in a bundle is an interpretation of the theory. In this way, neoclassical preference theory (Hicks, 
1946; Samuelson, 1947) can be used for agents who are either self-regarding or other-regarding. 
As such, strictly speaking, the received results of generous sharing in standard dictator games do 
not represent a rejection of neoclassical preference theory. Rather, they represent a rejection of a 
joint hypothesis: neoclassical preferences and the assumption that preferences are self-regarding.  
                                                 
6 Moral cost models have been suggested in previous work (e.g., Levitt and List, 2007; DellaVigna et al., 2012; 
Kessler and Leider, 2012; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Krupka and Weber, 2013; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2015. 
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 More recently, List (2007) and Bardsley (2008), amongst others, have used laboratory 
dictator game experiments to explore how choices are influenced by introducing opportunities for 
the dictator to take from another subject. This line of work presents a challenge for convex 
preference theory, as we explain. We use this literature as our starting point, and design treatments 
that pose a more fundamental challenge to choice rationality than heretofore explored. 
 
2.1 Experimental Design 
Following List (2007), our design begins by introducing an action set in which the dictator can 
either give to or take from the recipient’s initial endowment and compares outcomes in this 
augmented game to those observed in dictator games in which the participant can only give to, or 
take from, the recipient. We extend this line of inquiry by considering treatments that vary the 
initial endowments but preserve the permissible set of actions.7  If the motivation behind choices 
is driven by final allocations only, as assumed in conventional theory, variation in the initial 
endowments within a given feasible set should have no impact on observed dictator behavior.  
Figure 1 shows three budget lines labeled “Equal,” “Inequality,” and “Envy.” The finite 
feasible sets are ordered pairs of integers on the lines. Labelling of the feasible sets reflects the 
location of the midpoints jB , , ,j Q I E  on the lines. The Symmetric treatments have endowment 
at jB  and permit the dictator to give (move the allocation towards jA ) or take (move the allocation 
towards jC ).  The Take treatments have endowment at jB  and permit the dictator to take (move 
the allocation towards jC ).  The Give treatments have endowment at jC  and permit the dictator 
to give (move the allocation towards jB ).  There are two prominent features of this design: (a) the 
corresponding Take and Give treatments have the same feasible set [ , ]j jB C ; and (b) a Symmetric 
treatment’s feasible set [ , ]j jA C  contains the corresponding Take and Give feasible set [ , ]j jB C
as a proper subset.  
  The experimental design is 3   3: (Equal, Inequality, Envy)   (Symmetric, Take, Give).8  
In the Inequality-Give treatment (with endowment at point IC  in the middle panel): the recipient 
has an endowment of 3; the dictator has an endowment of 27 and can give up to 8 to the recipient. 
                                                 
7 These treatments build upon work by Korenok et al. (2014) and Grossman and Eckel (2015), who employ a variant 
of the dictator game to explore the effect of give or take actions on choices. 
8 The treatments used in the experiment reported herein are similar to ones used in the experiment reported in the 
working paper, Cox et al. (2016), which utilizes variations in initial endowments and feasible actions to explore the 
importance of moral reference points on the choices of young children.     
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In the Inequality-Take treatment (with endowment at point IB  in the middle panel): the recipient 
has an endowment of 11; the dictator has an endowment of 19 and can take up to 8 from the 
recipient. In the Inequality-Symmetric treatment (with endowment at point IB  in the middle 
panel): the recipient has an endowment of 11; the dictator has an endowment of 19 and can give 
up to 8 or take up to 8.  The Equal and Envy treatments change the locations of the (point B  or 
point )C  endowments but preserve the give, take, or symmetric action sets.  In the Equal feasible 
set, the Symmetric and Take endowment (at point 
QB  in the left panel) is 15 for the recipient and 
15 for the dictator. In the Envy feasible set, the Symmetric and Take endowment (at point 
EB  in 
the right panel) is 19 for the recipient and 11 for the dictator. 
   
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE: FEASIBLE SETS 
 
In the Inequality-Symmetric and Envy-Give treatments, the dictator is faced with an 
allocation decision over a budget set that crosses the 45 degree line, as in most standard dictator 
games.  In the Equal-Take and Equal-Symmetric treatments, the initial endowment lies on the 45 
degree line. However, the treatments differ in that the feasible set for the Equal-Take treatment 
lies on and below the 45 degree line whereas the feasible budget set for the Equal-Symmetric 
treatment crosses the 45 degree line.   
The nine treatments are constructed to stress-test all consequentialist theories: (a) the same 
action (of give or take) amount x  produces very different allocations (consequences) in different 
treatment cells; (b) the same allocation (consequence) results from different give or take actions 
in different treatment cells.  
 
2.2 Protocol 
The experiment was conducted in the laboratory of the Experimental Economics Center at Georgia 
State University using students recruited from the student body at Georgia State. When they agreed 
to participate, subjects knew only that they would be in an economics experiment, but not the exact 
nature of the experiment. Subjects were given as much time as they wanted to read instructions on 
their computer monitors. After they were finished reading, summary instructions were projected 
on a screen and read aloud by an experimenter to make clear that all subjects were given the same 
information about the decision task. All subjects participated in two practice dictator decisions 
without payoffs to become familiar with both the underlying allocation task and the computer 
interface. No information was given to subjects about others’ practice decisions. After the practice 
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decisions were completed, subjects were informed that the computer would randomly assign them 
to be active decision makers or passive recipients and that this information would appear on their 
screen before the start of the first actual round of play. They were further informed that each active 
subject would make two decisions while paired with the same recipient and that one of the two 
decisions would be randomly selected for payoff once both decision rounds were completed.  It 
was stressed that these pairings were anonymous and that participants would not know the identity 
of the person with whom they were paired.    
The two decision tasks each subject faced allow us to conduct within-subjects tests of 
consistency with rational choice theory. A subject made decisions in Give and Take action sets for 
the same (Equal or Inequality or Envy) setting; or the subject made decisions in Symmetric and 
Give or Take action sets for the same setting.  The order of the games each active subject faced 
was independently randomly selected so there would be no treatment order effects. Subjects were 
asked to complete a short survey after all decisions were made.  Once all subjects had completed 
the survey, they were paid individually and in private their earnings for the chosen decision round. 
Subject instructions and the survey are available online: http://excen.gsu.edu/jccox/instructions.  
 
3. THEORY DEVELOPMENT  
As noted above, Figure 1 portrays the feasible sets faced by subjects in our dictator games. Self-
regarding (or homo economicus) preferences imply the choice of jC  in all treatments. Models of 
other-regarding preferences predict choices that may differ from .jC  For strictly convex 
preferences, one can make additional statements as follows.  When (in a Symmetric action set) a 
most preferred allocation 
*
jQ  in feasible set [ ,C ]j jA  does not belong to the subset [ , ]j jB C  then 
strict convexity requires jB  to be the unique most preferred allocation when (in a Give or Take 
action set) the budget set is [ , ]j jB C .
9  In addition, when (in a Give or Take action set) a most 
preferred allocation 
*
jQ  in feasible set [ ,C ]j jB  is not jB  then strict convexity requires 
*
jQ  to be 
the unique most preferred allocation when the budget set is [ , ]j jA C . These statements apply to 
neoclassical theory of other-regarding preferences and to popular models of social preferences 
                                                 
9 For any given feasible allocation, X from [ , ]j jB C , allocation  jB is a convex combination of X and  
*
jQ  (that 
belongs to ( , ]j jB C . Since  
*
jQ   is revealed preferred to X in [ ,C ]j jA , by strict convexity jB is strictly preferred to 
X. 
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(e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002).10 
 Choice implied by convex preferences and rational choice are different concepts. Convex 
preference theory is a special case of rational choice theory that imposes far stronger restrictions 
on observable choices. Consequentialist rational choice theory requires that there be a choice 
function (Zermelo, 1904) which satisfies certain consistency axioms (Samuelson, 1938; Chernoff, 
1954; Arrow, 1959; Sen, 1971, 1986).  A choice function, defined on a collection X  of nonempty 
sets, assigns to each set S  in X  a choice set S

 of elements of S.  A choice function is single-
valued if the choice sets are singletons.  If we let F  denote the choice set when the opportunity 
set is F and G

 be the choice set when the opportunity set is G then the Chernoff (1954) 
Contraction Axiom (also known as Property α from Sen 1971) states: 
Property  : if G F then F G G    
In other words, a most-preferred allocation f F   from feasible set F remains a most-preferred 
allocation in any contraction of the set that contains the allocation .  For non-singleton choice 
sets, there is a second consistency axiom, Sen’s (1971) Property β.11  In this paper we consider 
singleton choice sets, in which Property   simplifies to: if *f G  then * *f g , i.e., 
*f  is also 
the choice  in G .   
 For finite feasible sets, Property   (the Contraction Axiom) is the necessary and sufficient 
condition for singleton choice sets to be rationalizable by a weak order (Sen, 1971).12  So we focus 
on properties of singleton choice sets and implications of Property  , which in our dictator game 
experiment are as follows: 
Choice Function Hypothesis. Given feasible set [ , ]j jB C , allocation 
*
jP  is chosen when 
the action set is Take and the endowment is at jB  if and only if it is chosen when the action 
set is Give and the endowment is at jC . 
Contraction Hypothesis. If allocation 
*
jQ , chosen in the Symmetric action set with 
                                                 
10 Note that these statements would not apply to some models of warm glow preferences, such as Korenok et al. 
(2013). 
11 Property β: if G F and G F    then G F  . In other words, if the most-preferred set F* for feasible set F 
contains at least one most-preferred point from the contraction set then it contains all of the most-preferred points of 
the contraction set. For finite sets, Properties α and β 
are necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice function to 
be rationalizable by a weak order (Sen, 1971). In case of choice sets being singletons, Property β is automatically 
satisfied.  
12 A weak order is complete and transitive.  
*f
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feasible set [ ,C ]j jA , belongs to the subset [ , ]j jB C then 
*
jQ  is also chosen when the action 
set is Give or Take and the feasible set is [ , ]j jB C .  
 
The Choice Function Hypothesis is an immediate implication of choice sets being 
singletons: the choice set of feasible set [ ,C ]j jB  contains one element, 
*.jP  This hypothesis is also 
implied by the Property   because any set (e.g. [ ,C ]j jB ) is a subset of itself.  
A behavioral interpretation of the Contraction Hypothesis as follows.  Choice of 
*
jQ  
belonging to [ , ]j jB C  when the feasible set is [ , ]j jA C  reveals that allocations in [ , )j jA B  are less 
desirable alternatives than 
*
jQ ; therefore excluding them from the feasible set should not affect 
choice.  For the sets in Figure 1, if a subject chooses an allocation in [ , ]j jB C  in the Symmetric 
game then she should choose the same allocation in the corresponding Take and Give games. 
Unlike convexity, Property   has no implication for choice from feasible set [ , ]j jB C  if the 
choice from [ , ]j jA C  is contained in [ , )j jA B  – a distinction that has been overlooked in the prior 
literature.  
Data from many dictator game experiments with giving and taking refute strict convexity, 
but choice rationality remains unclear. For example, consider Figure 2, which shows data from 
List (2007) and Bardsley (2008).13  Previous discussions of List’s data have focused on comparing 
the 29% of choices of 0 in the Baseline (standard dictator game allowing giving up to $5) treatment 
with the 65% of the choices of -1 or 0 in the Take 1 treatment (standard dictator game augmented 
to allow taking $1 from the recipient). An implication of convexity is that these figures should be 
(statistically) the same – a pattern that is clearly refuted by the data.14  
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE: HISTOGRAMS FOR LIST AND BARDSLEY DATA 
 
Convexity, however, is not a necessary condition for choice rationality, so comparison of 
these 29% and 65% figures does not allow the researcher to draw conclusions about choice 
rationality. An illustration of rational choices for non-convex preferences is shown in Figure 3. A 
                                                 
13 The data for List (2007) are from the JPE online appendix.  
14 The initial endowments are the same in these two treatments hence we can discuss implications of convex 
preference theory for either payoffs or transfers.  
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dictator with such preferences would choose y  from the set [ , ]A C  but switch to x  (rather than 
)B  when she faces set [ , ]B C .  
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE: EXAMPLE OF CHOICE WITH NON-CONVEX PREFERENCES 
 
The feasible set for the Baseline treatment in List (2007) is a contraction of the set for the 
Take 1 treatment. Therefore, by Property  , anyone choosing an amount from $0 to $5 in the 
Take 1 treatment should make the same choice in the Baseline treatment. In contrast to the special 
case of convex preferences, rational choice theory offers no suggestions for the Baseline treatment 
if one is observed to choose -$1 in the Take 1 treatment. Rational choice theory: (a) can 
accommodate someone who takes in the Take 1 treatment and gives in the Baseline treatment; but 
(b) cannot accommodate someone who gives different amounts in the Take 1 and Baseline 
treatments.   
The above properties of rational choice theory imply that each of the bars portraying 
fractions of choices of $0 to $5 in the Take 1 treatment should not be higher than the corresponding 
bar for choices in the Baseline. With the exception of the bar at $1.50 (corresponding to two 
observations in the Take 1 treatment), the List (2007) data are consistent with rational choice 
theory. Similarly, data shown in Figure 2 from Experiment 2 conducted by Bardsley (2008) are 
inconsistent with convex preferences but are mostly consistent with rational choice theory; the bar 
at $1.50 (2 observations) is the only inconsistency with rational choice theory in Experiment 2 
data. 
As we shall explain in Section 4, data from some of the treatments in our experiment are 
inconsistent with rational choice theory, which prompts interest in modification of the theory. We 
next turn our attention to that topic to provide the theoretical foundation for our experimental 
design and to aid in the interpretation of the data patterns discussed in the empirical results section 
that will follow.  
 
3.2 Theory of Moral Reference Points 
A framework that has been used to describe giving, taking, and related behaviors builds upon the 
notion of moral cost (Levitt and List, 2007; List, 2007; Lazear et al., 2012; DellaVigna et al., 2012) 
or concern for norm compliance (Kessler and Leider, 2012; Krupka and Weber, 2013; Kimbrough 
and Vostroknutov, 2015). Using this framework, individuals are said to share with others to avoid 
12 
 
experiencing moral cost from failing to do so or from taking actions that are deemed socially 
inappropriate.  We put this approach on an axiomatic foundation that incorporates moral reference 
points that are observable features of feasible sets.   
We begin with an intuitive discussion of moral reference points, and moral monotonicity 
in choice behavior, for the specific context of dictator games. We then provide a formal definition 
of a moral reference point to make clear that it is an observable feature of feasible sets. We 
subsequently formalize the definition of moral monotonicity in the form of an axiom that modifies 
(consequentialist) rational choice theory.   
To get a feeling of the concept of moral cost, consider the feasible sets in the right (Envy) 
and the left (Inequality) budget sets in Figure 1. The lowest feasible payoff for the recipient is $11 
in the Envy-Give treatment and $3 in the Inequality-Give treatment. Allocating the recipient a 
payoff of $11 may inflict moral cost in the Envy-Give treatment (where it results from the most 
selfish15 possible action of giving $0) whereas that same allocation of $11 may deliver moral 
benefit in the Inequality-Give treatment (where it results from the most generous possible action 
of giving $8). It seems plausible to assume that moral cost decreases with the difference between 
payoff allocated to the recipient and the recipient payoff that would result from the most selfish 
feasible option of the dictator. We build this intuition into our model by assuming that one 
dimension of the moral reference point for sharing behavior is determined by the recipient payoff 
at the most selfish feasible action available to the dictator.  This is dimension 2r  in our formal 
definition of moral reference points below.   
Another intuitive feature of moral cost relates to the dictator’s position. Consider, for 
example, the Inequality-Take and Envy-Take treatments. Allocating oneself a payoff of $19 in the 
Inequality-Take treatment results from the most generous feasible action of taking $0 from the 
recipient.  In contrast, allocating oneself a $19 payoff in the Envy-Take treatment results from the 
most selfish possible action of taking the maximum of $8 from the recipient. It seems plausible to 
assume that moral cost increases with the difference between the amount of payoff allocated to 
oneself and the own-payoff that would result from the most generous action available. We build 
this intuition into our model by assuming that the other dimension of the moral reference point for 
                                                 
15
In discussing dictator games in this section, we label choices in the way it is most commonly done in everyday 
conversation.  A “most selfish” choice is the one that provides the dictator with the largest money payoff (and the 
recipient with the smallest money payoff) out of all feasible choices. A “most generous” choice is the one that 
provides the recipient with the largest money payoff (and the dictator with the smallest money payoff) out of all 
feasible choices.   
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sharing behavior is determined, in part, by the own-payoff that results from the most generous 
action available to the dictator.  But the dictator’s moral cost may also vary inversely with the 
entitlement provided by her endowment in the game. In the Inequality-Symmetric treatment, for 
example, allocating oneself a payoff of $19 results from the action of standing pat, and neither 
taking of giving anything. In contrast, in the Envy-Symmetric treatment allocating oneself a payoff 
of $19 results from the action of taking the maximum feasible amount of $8 from the recipient.  
We build these intuitions into the model by assuming that the other dimension of the moral 
reference point is a convex combination of the own-payoff that results from the most generous  
possible choice and the entitlement payoff provided by the dictator’s endowment. The central 
results that follow are invariant to the mixing proportion used in the convex combination. For 
simplicity, we use the mixing proportion one-half. This is dimension 1r  in our formal definition of 
moral reference point below. 
We now formalize these intuitions with an axiomatic model that follows the approach used 
in Cox and Sadiraj (2010). The idea is to require that choices from feasible sets that preserve moral 
reference points (defined below) satisfy Property   and to present a concept of moral reference 
points that are determined by observable features of feasible sets. Throughout our discussion in 
this section we use dictator games as an example to illustrate concepts but the model has more 
general applicability, as explained in section 6.  
Let ( , )m y  denote an ordered pair of payoffs in which my payoff, m is that of the dictator 
and your payoff, y  is that of the recipient. Let the dictator’s opportunity set be a compact finite 
set .F  Let 
om  and oy  be the maximum feasible payoffs for the dictator and the recipient, that is  
( ) max{ | ( , ) }om F m m y F    and  ( ) max{ | ( , ) }oy F y m y F   
It is natural to think of the minimal expectations point, * *( , )m y  as the dictator’s payoff when the 
recipient’s gets oy  and recipient’s payoff when the dictator gets ,om  i.e.,  
 ( ) min{ : ( , ( ) }  
om F m m y F F  and ( ) min{ : ( ( ), }  
oy F y m F y F . 
Moral cost may depend on the minimal expectations point and payoff entitlement from the 
decision maker’s endowment. Therefore we propose as a moral reference point an ordered pair 
that agrees with the minimal expectations point on the second (recipient’s) payoff dimension and 
is a convex combination of the minimal expectations point and the initial endowment me  on the 
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first (dictator’s) payoff dimension. For dictator game feasible sets we consider, the moral reference 
points are given by:16  
 
1 1
2 2
(( ( ) ), ( ))  
F
mm F e y Fr  
 
 An algorithm for locating moral reference points is provided here for the Give, Take, and 
Symmetric action sets and Equal, Inequality, and Envy endowment treatments shown in Figure 1. 
With such downward-sloping budget lines, a moral reference point can be located by: (a) first, find 
the minimal expectations point, * *( , )m y  by constructing a right triangle with the budget line as the 
hypotenuse and the vertical and horizontal sides below and to the left of the budget line; (b) second, 
find the midpoint of the line segment joining * *( , )m y  and e  (the endowment), and (c) finally, 
orthogonally project the midpoint onto the line segment joining * *( , )m y  and the most selfish point.  
The moral reference points, 1 2( , )
F F Fr rr  for our various treatments are shown in Table 1. 
For the Inequality treatment, for example, the moral reference points are (23,3) in Give, (19,3) in 
Take, and (15,3) in Symmetric.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
We use action sets shown in Figure 1 to illustrate a behavioral interpretation of moral 
reference points. If we look at the Inequality treatment the recipient coordinate, 2r (=3) of the moral 
reference points are the same across the three scenarios: Give, Take and Symmetric. In contrast 
the dictator coordinate, 1r  varies from 23 to 19 to 15, which reflects the changes in the dictator 
minimal expectation payoff or initial endowment. One would expect a dictator to feel more entitled 
to a larger own payoff as her moral reference coordinate decreases while the recipient’s coordinate 
remains constant. On the contrary, if we look at the Inequality-Symmetric, Equal-Take and Envy-
Give treatments, the dictator coordinate, 1r (=15) of the moral reference point remains constant. In 
contrast, the recipient coordinate 2r  varies from 3 to 7 to 11, which reflects the changes in the 
recipient’s minimal expectation payoff. One would expect a dictator to feel obliged to allocate 
more to the recipient as the recipient’s moral reference coordinate increases while the dictator’s 
coordinate remains constant, as formalized in MMA.   
                                                 
16 A less specific definition of the moral reference point is 
1 2
( , ) (( ( ) (1 ) ), ( ))
m
r r m F e y F 
 
  
 
where   is between 0 
and 1. Any value of [0,1)   provides moral reference points that make MMA consistent with all of the contraction 
and action set effects we discuss for the experiment reported herein. 
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Our many applications of theory in this paper will all be to two-agent (dictator and 
strategic) games. Some future applications of our theory to novel situations, however, will require 
identification of the observable moral reference points when there are more than two agents.  
Endowments for n  agents will typically be specified, hence are observable. Identification of 
observable minimal expectations payoffs for 2n   players can proceed as follows.  Let y  denote 
the vector of payoffs of n  players. Let the feasible set be a finite set .F  Let 0  ( 1,2, , )i ny i     be 
the maximum feasible payoff for player i ( 1,2, n  ), that is  
( ) max{ | }oj jy F y F y  
The minimal expectations point, *
F
y  is defined as follows.  For each player j , define player i ’s 
minimal expectation payoff  with respect to j  as  
* min{ | ( , }
F o
ij i j jy y y F y  
Let 
 
S
i
={y
*ij
F : j ¹ i)  be the set of i ’s minimal expectation points. Naturally, player i  expects her 
payoff to be no smaller than the smallest element in iS ; thus  
y
*i
F = minS
i
, which is the ith element of 
the vector *
F
y . 
We now turn our attention to moral monotonicity. We postulate that agents’ choices, 
characterized by moral cost concerns, satisfy a monotonicity criterion with respect to moral 
reference points. We now formalize this in an axiom for n -players. Let *F  be the choice set for 
feasible set F  (and similarly for 
*G  and G ).  Let Gr  and Fr  be the moral reference points for 
feasible sets G  and ,F  and let áñ  be the notation for “not smaller” or “not larger.” For every 
player ( 1, , )i n  one has: 
 
Moral Monotonicity Axiom (MMA):  
If G F ,  
G F
i ir r and ,
G F
i ir r    then  
* * *,i iF G g f G
       f g  
 
In words, MMA says the following. Suppose that G  is a subset of F  that contains some 
choice *f  from F . Suppose also that the moral reference points of F  and G  differ from each 
other only with respect to the value of dimension i . If the moral reference point in G  is more 
favorable to individual i, then no choice from G  allocates him less than *f .  Similarly, if the moral 
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reference point in G  is less favorable to player i , then no choice from G  allocates him more than 

f .  
What are the implications of MMA for contractions that preserve moral reference points 
and contain choices from the bigger set? We show that for such subsets MMA implies that the 
choice set is a singleton and that conventional axioms of rationality (Sen’s 1971 Properties  and 
 ) are satisfied. The modified form of Sen’s Property 𝛼 for sets that preserve the moral reference 
point is17  
Property M : if G F and 
G Fr r  then * *F G G    
For singleton choice sets, this simplifies to: if * Gf  and G Fr r then * *g = f  is chosen in G .   
We are ready now to state implications of MMA for choices.18 
Proposition 1: MMA implies Property M  
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Thus, for opportunity sets that preserve moral reference points, MMA suffices for choices to be 
rationalizable.  
 
3.3 Testable Implications of MMA vs. Property    
MMA has many testable implications for the action sets and endowment treatments in our 
experiment. For example, in the Equal treatment, the moral reference point is (19,7) in the Give 
action set but (15,7) in the Take action set. Therefore, MMA implies that the choice in Give is 
southeast of the choice in Take, which means the dictator allocates a (weakly) larger own payoff 
in Give than in Take. This contrasts with the implication of conventional rational choice theory 
that the Give and Take action sets have the same outcomes. The same type of argument can be 
used to show that, in the Envy and Equal endowment treatments, MMA implies a smaller 
allocation to the dictator in the Take than in the Give (but larger than in the Symmetric) whereas 
conventional theory implies identical allocations when from [B,C].  
 
  
                                                 
17 For non-singleton choice sets, the analogue of Sen’s (1971) Property β is Property βM: if G F  and G Fr r  
then 
* *G F    implies * *G F . 
18 The proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A also shows that MMA implies Property βM .  
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4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
4.1 Overview 
612 subjects (306 dictators) participated in the experiment. None of the dictators had previous 
experience in dictator games. Each session lasted approximately 50 minutes and each dictator 
made two decisions. The actual payoffs (from the randomly selected payoff rounds) for dictators 
were: $19.46 (average) with the range $8 (minimum) to $27 (maximum). Average payoffs and 
transfers19 for all data from nine treatment cells are reported in Table 1.    
Less than 1/3 (166 out of 612) of observed choices correspond to the most selfish feasible 
options and less than 1/5 (57 out of 306) of dictators appear selfish (i.e., always choose the most 
selfish option). Data exhibit egocentric altruism (Cox and Sadiraj, 2007) as almost all choices 
(98%) are such that the dictator’s final payoff (weakly) exceeded recipient’s final payoff.20 All 
data from Give and Take treatments with feasible sets [Bk,Ck] are usable for testing convex 
preference theory, conventional rational choice theory (Property  ), and modified rational choice 
theory incorporating the Moral Monotonicity Axiom (MMA). Choices from [Ak,Bk) in a 
Symmetric treatment are not usable for testing rational choice theory.  Overall, 94% (575 out of 
612) of choices are from sets [Bi,Ci] and are thus usable in testing all theories.  
We begin with tests of convex preferences, Principal   and MMA using only within-
subjects choice pairs. Subsequently, we use all of the data to ascertain whether observed subjects’ 
transfers are affected by moral reference points as predicted by MMA. 
 
4.2 Consistency of Dictators’ Choices with Theoretical Models.  
Each dictator made two decisions from the same (Inequality, Equal or Envy) environment: 96 
dictators faced budget set [Bk,Ck] twice, in one Give action set and one Take action set; a different 
group of 98 dictators faced budget set [Ak,Ck] in the Symmetric action set and budget set [Bk,Ck] 
in the Give action set; and another group of 112 dictators faced budget set [Ak,Ck] in the Symmetric 
action set and budget set [Bk,Ck] in the Take action set. We created a dummy variable, Consistency, 
that takes value 1 only if a individual’s two decisions agreed with a theoretical prediction.  For 
each dictator, we construct three distinct consistency measures capturing whether choices for that 
                                                 
19 “Transfer” is defined as the amount by which the recipient’s payoff exceeds her minimum expectations payoff. In 
a Give treatment, the transfer is the amount the dictator gives to the recipient. In a Take treatment, the transfer is the 
amount the dictator does not taken from the recipient.   
20 Dictator’s final payoff was strictly larger than the recipient’s payoff in 80% (489 out of 612) of choices.   
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subject were consistent with the predictions under (i) MMA, (ii) Property  , and (iii) convex 
preference theory. 
 To test whether choices in our data are better explained by MMA than either of our 
alternative models, we conduct a sign test using our indicator variable Consistency.  Specifically, 
for each agent i we construct a new variable iz  that is the difference in the Consistency indicator 
under the assumption that choice reflects MMA and the indicator for each of the alternative 
models.  We then drop individuals whose choices are consistent with both MMA and the 
alternative model and assign a value of -1 to dictators whose choices are inconsistent with both 
models.  Under the null hypothesis that MMA is no more likely to organize choice in our 
experiment than either of the alternative models, this new variable should follow a binomial 
distribution and the likelihood that 1iz   should be one-half.  The alternative hypothesis is a one-
sided test that the likelihood 1iz   is greater than one-half. 
 Table 2 reports the fraction of dictators whose choices are consistent with a given model – 
convex preference theory, MMA, or Property  . The first three rows of the table correspond to 
the choices for dictators who were assigned to a given environment (i) Inequality, (ii) Equal, or 
(iii) Envy whereas the final row reports data for all dictators in our experiment.  The first two 
columns of the table compare whether observed choices are better organized by MMA or convex 
preference theory whereas the final two columns compare whether choices are better organized by 
MMA or standard rational choice theory.     
Property  vs. MMA. We test for data consistency with Property   (the Contraction Axiom) by 
excluding 37 (out of 306) dictators whose choices in a Symmetric action set were from [Ai,Bi) 
because Property   makes no prediction for their choices when the budget set is [Bi,Ci]. The last 
two columns of Table 2 show the fraction of choices for the remaining 269 dictators that were 
consistent with Property α (column 3) and MMA (column 4).  As noted in the final row of Table 
2, about half of the remaining dictators (135 out of 269) made choices that are consistent with 
Property   and 78% (210 out of 269) made choices that are consistent with MMA. The Sign test 
weakly rejects Property   in favor of MMA using data from all three environments. The observed 
pattern, whereby the fraction of dictators whose choices are consistent with MMA is greater than 
the fraction whose choices are consistent with standard rational choice theory, is robust across the 
three (Envy, Inequality and Equal) environments.  However, only data from the Equal environment 
reject Property   in favor of MMA at conventional levels. 
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Convex Preferences vs. MMA. Convexity requires invariance to action sets for all choices from 
(Bi, Ci] but it makes no predictions on [Ak,Bk) when Bk is chosen from [Bk,Ck]. Eighteen dictators 
in our experiment chose Bk in the Give or Take scenario and an allocation in [Ak,Bk) in the 
Symmetric action set. Since these choice pairs are uninformative for testing convexity they are 
excluded in the analysis below, leaving us with 288 dictators. 21 Convexity predicts the dictators’ 
two payoffs in their two choices will be the same whereas MMA predicts a larger payoff in the 
scenario with the larger dictator moral reference point dimension 1r .  The first two columns of 
Table 2 show the fraction of choices for the 288 dictators whose choices are consistent with convex 
preference theory (column 1) and MMA (column 4).  As noted in the final row of the table, less 
than half (47% or 135 out of 288) of dictators make choices that are consistent with convex 
preferences; 80% (229 out of 288) are consistent with MMA whereas 20% violate MMA. The first 
two columns of Table 2 show consistency figures for Convexity and MMA for each pair of games 
as well as pooled data (last row). Convexity is rejected in favor of MMA by the Sign test at 
conventional levels of significance for the pooled data and for dictators assigned to either the 
Inequality or Equal environments.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. CONSISTENCY WITH CONVEXITY, PROPERTY  AND MMA 
 
Size Effects and MMA.  Recall that the recipient moral reference point dimension 2r  is fixed for 
any given (Inequality, Equal or Envy) environment (see Table 1) so variation in choices that violate 
Property   or convex preferences reveal an 1r  effect. To further investigate this effect, a new 
variable P  was constructed by subtracting a dictator’s observed payoff in the treatment with 
smaller MMA-predicted payoff from the dictator’s payoff in the treatment with (strictly or weakly) 
larger MMA-predicted payoff. Figure 4 shows histograms of P across the three treatments as 
well as pooled data. The null hypothesis, 0P   is implied by Property   or convex preferences. 
The alternative hypothesis, 0P   is consistent with MMA.  
 
Figure 4 About Here. Histograms of ΔP (within subjects) 
 
                                                 
21 An alternative way is to replace all choices from [Ak,Bk) with Bk before analyzing data. Findings from this 
alternative procedure are similar (though more in favor of MMA) to excluding data from these (18) dictators, which 
is a more conservative approach. 
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The overall mean of P  (288 subjects) is 0.60 (95% C.I. is [0.260, 0.934]). Means of P  
across the three games are: 0.23 (Envy, one-sided p-value=0.138), 0.96 (Inequality, one-sided p-
value=0.005) and 0.63 (Equal, one-sided p-value=0.023). 22  The null hypothesis, 0P   is 
rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis implied by MMA using the t-test (one-sided p-value 
= 0.000).  
To test for Property a  we exclude choices of thirty-seven subjects for whom Property a  
makes no predictions. The mean of P  (269 subjects) is 0.19 (95% C.I. is [-0.096, 0.475]). Means 
of P  across the three games are: 0.05 (Envy, one-sided p-value=0.379), 0.12 (Inequality, one-
sided p-value=0.343) and 0.40 (Equal, one-sided p-value=0.082). The null hypothesis, 0P   is 
arguably rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis implied by MMA using the t-test (one-
sided p-value = 0.096). 
Together, results from the above tests using within-subjects data, can be summarized as 
follows.  
Result 1: Data support MMA when the moral reference point is more favorable to the dictator. 
Specifically, our data suggest that final allocations depend upon the dictator’s moral reference 
point and that payoffs for the dictator are increasing in this reference point.  This finding is at odds 
with convex preference theory and standard rational choice theory but consistent with the 
predictions of MMA and our theory of moral costs.23  
 
4.3 Test of MMA when the Recipient Moral Reference Dimension Changes 
MMA says that the recipient’s payoff increases in 2r  when 1r  is fixed whereas convexity and 
Property   predict no effect from changes in 2r . To test for 2r  effects, we need to look across 
environments.24 We have data for three levels of 1r  that can be used to test responses to changing 
                                                 
22 For 18 subjects with choice B in a Give or Take action set and from [Ai, Bi) in the Symmetric design, a positive P  
could reflect the constraints of the experimental design rather than an 1r  effect. To prevent this potential confound 
from possibly biasing the test we are excluding P  values for these 18 subjects.  
23 Result 1 is consistent with findings from Cox et al. (2016) who use a similar experimental design to test the 
importance of moral reference points on the choices of young children. As in our experiment, data from Cox et al. 
(2016) show that final allocations depend on both initial endowments and feasible actions.  As such, dictator choices 
in their experiment violate the standard model of rational choice and any model that assumes convex preferences but 
provide support for MMA.     
24 There are five possible values of r1 in our experiment: 7, 11, 15, 19, 23. There is only one treatment (Envy-
Symmetric) with 1 7r  and only one treatment (Inequality-Give) with 1 23r . As there is no variation of 2r  with 
these two 1r  values we can't use data from these two treatments to directly test MMA in terms of 2r .    
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values of 2r . We use Tobit models for our formal analysis throughout since the feasible choices 
are bounded by the design of the experiment. 
 To evaluate whether the recipient’s minimal expectations point influences allocations as 
predicted under MMA, we estimate two Tobit models – one that conditions choice solely upon 2r
and a second that augments this model to include demographic controls for the dictator (gender, 
race, GPA, religion, major, study year) – for each of the three levels of 1r  in our experiment.  Each 
model controls for potential budget constraints (common support across games with a given 1r ) by 
setting as a lower bound the lowest possible payoff a recipient could receive in the common support 
and as an upper bound the highest possible payoff a recipient could receive in the common support.  
Under standard models, the estimated coefficient on the minimal expectations point should be 
equal to zero whereas MMA predicts that recipient payoffs are increasing in r2 and thus a positive 
coefficient on this measure.  Table 3 presents results for these models.  The first two columns 
restrict the analysis to the subset of choice where 1r  = 15.  The third and fourth columns restrict 
the analysis to those choices where 1r  = 19 and the final two columns to those choices where 1r  = 
11.    
Data for 1r =15: There are three treatments with the same 1r =15 but three different 2r  
levels: Inequality-Symmetric ( 2r =3), Equal-Take ( 2r =7) and Envy-Give ( 2r =11). The recipient’s 
average payoffs across the three treatments (see Table 1) increase as 2r  increases: 9.12 (Inequality-
Symmetric), 10.17 (Equal-Take) and 13.43 (Envy-Give). The feasible payoffs for the recipient in 
these three treatments are integers in the sets: [3, 19] in Inequality-Symmetric, [7,15] in Equal-
Take and [11,19] in Envy-Give. The budget sets for Envy-Give and Equal-Take are both 
contractions of the Inequality-Symmetric budget set. Note that set [11,15] is included in all three 
treatments. To control for constraints of budget sets on choices, we run Tobit regressions of 
recipients’ final payoffs on data from the three treatments using 11 as the lower bound and 15 as 
the upper bound. Table 3 reports Tobit estimates of 2r  using models with and without demographic 
control variables. Consistent with MMA, the estimates for 2r  are positive (p<0.001), which rejects 
the null hypothesis of conventional preferences (that the estimate is 0) in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis from MMA.  
Data for 1r =19: Treatments Inequality-Take and Equal-Give have both 1r =19 but 2r  
values are 3 and 7, respectively. The feasible payoffs for the recipient are from: [3,11] in 
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Inequality-Take and [7,15] in Equal-Give. Set [7,11] is a subset of both sets, therefore we run Tobit 
regressions of recipient’s final payoff with low bound 7 and upper bound 11. Tobit estimates for 
effect of 2r  on recipient’s payoff are positive (p<0.1) which weakly rejects the null hypothesis 
from conventional preferences that the estimate is 0 in favor of the alternative hypothesis from 
MMA.  
Data for 1r =11: There are two treatments (Envy-Take, 2r =11 and Equal-Symmetric, 2r =7) 
with 1r =11. The feasible set, [11, 19] in Envy-Take is a contraction of the feasible set, [7,23] in 
Equal-Symmetric. So, we run Tobit regression with bounds 11 and 19. Tobit estimates for 2r  are 
positive (p<0.05), which rejects the null hypothesis from conventional preferences that the 
estimate is 0 in favor of the alternative hypothesis from MMA.  
Thus, using between-subjects data we conclude that:  
 
Result 2: Data are consistent with MMA when the moral reference point is more favorable to the 
recipient. 
Across all models, the estimated coefficient on 2r  (the recipient’s minimal expectations point) is 
positive.  Holding the dictator’s moral reference point constant, we find that a recipient’s payoff 
is increasing in the minimal amount they could earn given the underlying budget set.  This 
dependence is at odds with standard models, but is consistent with the predictions of MMA and 
provide additional evidence that moral reference points influence dictator behavior.     
 
4.4 MMA and Transfers 
The previous two sections provided direct tests of MMA with the focus on the payoff of the player 
favored by the moral reference point. In this section, we turn our attention to indirect implications 
of MMA and the effect of moral reference points on transfers, which is the dictator’s choice 
defined in terms of “giving”. 25  Unless we look at budget sets with certain characteristics (as in 
the previous sections on direct tests of MMA) differences in the support of feasible budget sets 
across environments confounds our ability to use payoffs to test additional implications of MMA.26 
To see the problem, note for example that the dictator’s payoff that corresponds to the most selfish 
                                                 
25 That is, in the Give action sets the transfer is the recorded subject’s choice. In the Take action set, taking x is by 
design equivalent in terms of recipient’s payoff to “giving” 8-x, hence the transfer is 8 - x. Similarly, in the Symmetric 
action set, the subject’s choice in terms of “giving” is 8- x if the subject takes x and 8+z if the subject gives z.  
26 By design, feasible budget sets shift north-west to the advantage of the recipient as we move from Inequality to 
Equal and then from Equal to Envy.   
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feasible choice decreases from $27 (Inequality) to $23 (Equal) and down to $19 (Envy). By design, 
payoffs to dictators in the Envy treatments will be lower than those in the Inequality treatments 
independent of any choice they make.  Looking at transfers (rather than payoffs) offers a way to 
control for this confound as the set of feasible transfers is invariant across our three environments 
(Inequality, Equality and Envy).   
The feasible set of transfers is: [0,8] in both Give and Take action sets and [0,16] in the 
Symmetric action set for all three environments. Appendix B provides detailed derivations of the 
implications of MMA and conventional theory for the effects of changing 1r  and 2r  on transfers. 
However, the basic intuition underlying these formal derivations is as follows. In terms of 2r  and 
dictator’s payoff m, any feasible transfer, t  satisfies the equation (*) 230 mt r   .
27 
Conventional theory (Property   or convex preferences) requires that the dictator’s most 
preferred allocation,  * *,m y  is preserved in all budget sets that contain it. Preservation of *m  
requires that optimal transfer, 
*t  decrease in 2r  but be invariant with respect to 1r . In contrast, for 
MMA we have: (1) larger 1r  (ceteris paribus) implies larger 
*m  which comes with a smaller 
*t ; 
and (2) the direct effect (see (*)) of a larger 2r  on 
*t  is negative whereas the indirect effect, 
2/ 0m r
   is positive because a larger 2r  (ceteris paribus) increases 
*y . The effect of 2r  on the 
optimal transfer is negative as the direct effect is stronger (see Appendix B).   
Thus, we have the following testable hypotheses that allow us to evaluate whether transfers 
in our experiment are better organized by standard rational choice theory or our alternative model 
and MMA:  
1
Hr : Marginal effects of 1r :  0 (Property α) or negative (MMA)  
2
Hr : Marginal effects of 2r :  -1 (Property α) or between -1 and 0 (MMA)  
The mean transfers are 4.99 (Inequality, 2r =3), 3.24 (Equal, 2r =7) and 2.37 (Envy, 2r =11).
28 This 
decreasing pattern is predicted by both MMA and conventional theory. However, the rate of 
decrease seems to be half of the size predicted by conventional theory. Table 4 reports results of a 
                                                 
27 The recipient’s final payoff is 2y tr   in every treatment and as our games are zero-sum games, the dictator’s 
payoff is 230 y 30 tm r     .  
28 Kruskal-Wallis test: Chi-squared=30.25, p-value=0.001; for each subject, the data point is the mean of two observed 
transfers.   
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Tobit regression that allows us to estimate the effect of changing moral reference points on 
observed transfers. The list of regressors includes dictator’s ( 1r ) and recipient’s ( 2r ) coordinates 
of moral reference points of budget sets and, in model (2), demographic controls. As each dictator 
made two choices, we cluster standard errors.  As a robustness check, Table 4 also present results 
from a Hurdle model (Cragg, 1971) which allows for the effects of moral reference points to differ 
along the extensive (whether to make a positive transfer) and intensive (the amount of any positive 
transfer) margins.  
As noted in the first row of Table 4, the estimated coefficient on  1r   is negative and 
different from 0.  The dependence of transfers on r1 rejects conventional preferences in favor of 
MMA. The estimate of 2r , row two of Table 4, is negative which is consistent with the trend 
observed in above reported means of transfers across games. The Wald test rejects the conventional 
theory hypothesis that the estimate equals -1.29 The estimates are consistent with MMA and are 
robust to both the inclusion of demographics in the regression and the use of a Hurdle model.  
This provides our next result based on within-subjects and between-subjects data analysis.   
  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE: TESTING 1r  and 2r  Effects on Transfers 
 
Result 3: Convex preferences and Property   are rejected in favor of MMA.   
 
In summary, our data provide empirical support for the predictions of changing moral reference 
points on transfers under MMA. In contrast, the data call into question the standard model of 
rational choice and models that assume convex preferences as organizing behavior in sharing 
games.  
 
Alternative Models. We now briefly look at implications of our data for alternative models of 
behavior: random choices, selfish preferences, social preferences, reference dependence (Koszegi 
and Rabin 2006), and sharing and sorting (Lazear, et al. 2012).  
Random Choice: Our dictator games are simple and, in addition our subjects participated 
in two practice rounds before making each of the two decisions. Nevertheless, if subjects are not 
paying attention any feasible transfer, any t  is equally likely to be chosen. The hypothesis of 
random choice is rejected because parameter estimates for 1r  and 2r  are statistically significant.   
                                                 
29 F(1,610)=30.50, p-value=0.000. 
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Selfish Preferences: Two-thirds of the transfers are positive and four out of five of our 
dictators made at least one positive transfer. Any feasible non-zero transfer reduces a dictator’s 
payoff; therefore, this model predicts that the transfer is always 0, and hence, neither changes in 
1r  nor 2r  will have an effect. Parameter estimates for both 1r  and 2r  are statistically significant; 
hence our data reject selfish behavior.  
Convex Social Preferences: All prominent models of social preferences, including 
inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), quasi-maximin 
(Charness and Rabin 2002), and egocentric altruism (Cox and Sadiraj 2007) assume convex upper 
contour sets. Because our data reject convex preference theory, these social preferences models 
are also rejected.  
 Reference Dependent Model. Koszegi and Rabin (2006) develop a model of reference 
dependence that has recently seen a surge in applied work. Predictions of this model for our games 
are similar to standard rational choice theory because, in deterministic settings, optimal 
“consumption” derived for the conventional preferences model is the “preferred personal 
equilibrium” in the reference dependent model.30  Because our data reject conventional theory, the 
reference dependent model is also rejected. 
 Sharing and Sorting. Lazear et al. (2012) offer a model of sharing that depends on the 
environment, ( , , )u D m y  where D takes value 1 when the environment allows sorting and 0 
otherwise.  In all of our treatments sorting is not available (i.e., people cannot sort in or out of 
participating in the games), hence implications of their model for play in our games are similar to 
standard preference theory, which is rejected by our data.   
 To summarize, not only do our data provide evidence at odds with standard rational choice 
theory, the data are also at odds with a suite of alternative behavioral models that have been used 
to explain sharing.  Viewed in its totality, we thus believe our data provides compelling evidence 
that objectively defined moral reference points matter and influence choice in a manner consistent 
with MMA.   
 
5. IMPLICATIONS OF MMA FOR OTHER TYPES OF DICTATOR GAMES 
 
To formalize the ways in which moral reference points may influence decision-making in dictator 
games, we introduced the Moral Monotonicity Axiom (MMA) and applied it to analyze data from 
                                                 
30 See Proposition 3 in Koszegi and Rabin (2006, pg.1145). 
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our experiment. Yet, MMA has broader implications for choice in a range of related experiments 
including standard (give-only) dictator games (Andreoni and Miller 2002), other dictator games 
that compare the effect of give versus take actions on choices (Korenok et al. 2014), the “bully” 
dictator game (Krupka and Weber 2013), and dictator games with outside options (Lazear, 
Malmendier, and Weber  2012). 
 
5.1 MMA and WARP 
As previously mentioned, Andreoni and Miller (2002) conducted dictator game experiments that 
varied underlying budget sets and applied the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) 
to analyze the consistency of choices in their setting. Figure 5 illustrates two budget sets like those 
that the dictator can face in the Andreoni and Miller design. Let point a denote the endowment on 
the steeper line and point b denote the endowment on the flatter line. Further, consider the shaded 
quadrilateral that is the intersection of sets bounded by the steeper and flatter budget lines. Viewed 
through the lens of MMA, the shaded quadrilateral set can be considered a feasible set with 
endowment at point a. The minimal expectations point is the origin (0,0) for all three feasible sets. 
Therefore, the moral reference points for the three feasible sets are on the horizontal axis, halfway 
between 0 and the respective endowment points. The moral reference point br  for the budget set 
represented by the flatter budget line is more favorable to the dictator than the moral reference 
point ar  for the set represented by the steeper budget line. 
 
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE: MMA AND WARP 
 
Now consider two choices A and B from the original sets that violate the weak axiom of 
revealed preference (WARP). Suppose that the dictator chooses A on the steeper budget line. Then 
MMA (see Proposition 1) requires that A also be chosen from the quadrilateral set because it is a 
contraction of the feasible set represented by the steeper line that preserves the moral reference 
point. Suppose that B is chosen from the lower flat triangle. MMA requires that the choice in the 
quadrilateral (which is also a contraction of the lower flat triangle) allocates to the dictator less 
than B does, because 
ar  is to the left of .
br  But this contradicts the choice of A from the 
quadrilateral set. Thus, any pair of choices of type A and B that violate WARP also violate MMA. 
In fact, MMA places tighter restrictions on data than does WARP (e.g., in Figure 5 WARP implies 
point A must be northwest of the intersection whereas MMA implies it must be west of point B).  
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5.2  Give and Take: MMA vs. Warm Glow  
Korenok et al. (2014) report a dictator game experiment to test the theoretical model of warm glow 
developed by Korenok et al. (2013). In particular, the authors explore the effects of changing 
endowments and framing actions as giving to or taking from the recipient. Korenok et al. (2014) 
explain that data from their experiment is inconsistent with the predictions of their theory which, 
in this instance, are the same as the predictions of the conventional rational choice model.  
Yet, the exhibited data patterns are consonant with our theory of moral costs.31  Figure 6 
illustrates five different scenarios in the Korenok et al. (2014) experiment. In all five scenarios, 
the feasible set is the same set of discrete points on the budget line shown in Figure 6. What varies 
across scenarios is the initial (endowed) allocation of $20 between the dictator and the recipient. 
We represent these scenarios using the numbered points on the budget line in Figure 6. For 
example, in scenario 1, the dictator is endowed with $20 and the recipient with $0. In scenario 9, 
the recipient is endowed with $20 and the dictator with $0. Other endowments used in the 
experiment are shown at points 3, 6, and 8 on the budget line in 6.  
 
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE: ENDOWMENTS & MORAL REFERENCE POINTS 
 
The Korenok et al. (2013) theory and conventional rational choice theory both imply that 
choices will be invariant to changes in the endowments in the experiment. In contrast, our theory 
implies that choices will monotonically track changes in the underlying endowment points. To see 
this, note that the minimal expectations point is the origin (0,0) in all scenarios. Hence, the 
corresponding moral reference points for all scenarios are on the horizontal axis, halfway between 
0 and the dictator’s endowments for each of the respective scenarios. We have illustrated the 
various moral reference points in Figure 6 as jr , for scenarios j = 1, 3, 6, 8, 9. MMA implies that 
choices monotonically move northwest as the endowment moves northwest along the budget line.  
Let S1 ($4.05) denote the average payoff of $4.05 to the recipient in scenario 1. Using this 
same convention to reflect payoffs in the remaining scenarios, we have that the average recipient 
payoffs for the five scenarios are: S1 ($4.05), S3 ($5.01), S6 ($5.61), S8 ($6.59), and S9 ($6.31). 
                                                 
31 Although we use the Korenok et al. (2014) data to explore implications of alternative theories, caution is called for 
in basing conclusions on those data because the payoff protocol used in the experiment is not incentive compatible. 
Their experiment involves role reversal in which each subject plays both dictator and recipient and is paid for both 
decisions. This payoff protocol might create an incentive for strategic behavior, not an incentive for truthful 
reporting of distributional preferences. Korenok et al. (2013), aware of this issue, report that this payoff protocol did 
not introduce significant bias in their experiment. Incentive compatibility of alternative payoff protocols is examined 
at length in Cox, Sadiraj, and Schmidt (2015).  
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The fact that average payoffs differ across endowments is inconsistent with predictions from the 
Korenok et al. (2013) theory and conventional rational choice theory. Importantly, however, the 
observed changes are as predicted by our theory except for the decrease from $6.59 to $6.31 
between scenario 8 and scenario 9 – a difference that Korenok et al. report to be statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels. 
 
5.3  MMA and Bully Games 
MMA predicts both dictator game choices and social norms elicited by Krupka and Weber (2013). 
In their experiment, the moral reference point is (5, 0) in the standard dictator game and (2.5, 0) in 
the bully dictator game. Hence, MMA requires choices in the bully treatment to be drawn from a 
distribution that is less favorable to the dictator than the distribution of choices in the standard 
game. Therefore, we expect a higher amount allocated to the recipient and a positive estimate of 
the bully treatment in an ordered logistic regression. The reported mean amounts allocated to the 
recipients are $2.46 (standard) and $3.11 (bully) and the coefficient estimate for the bully treatment 
is significantly positive (see their Table 2).  
Moreover, the distribution of elicited norms reported in Krupka and Weber’s Table 1 are 
also consistent with MMA. A paired t-test of the two distributions rejects the null hypothesis of no 
effect (implied by Property  ) in favor of the MMA-consistent alternative (approval of higher 
allocations to recipients).  Hence, both actual choices and elicited beliefs in Krupka and Weber 
(2013) are consistent with MMA and highlight the importance of objectively defined moral 
reference points.   
 
5.4  MMA and Outside Options 
Lazear, et al. (2012) report an extended experimental design for dictator games that includes an 
outside option that allows subjects to opt out of the dictator game. Their Experiment 1 is a between-
subjects design in which one group of subjects plays a “distribute $10” dictator game and another 
group of subjects can choose an outside option, that pays the dictator $10 and the other subject $0, 
or choose to play the distribute $10 dictator game.32 The Lazear, et al. Experiment 2 is a within-
subjects design including several decisions with one selected randomly for payoff. In Decision 1, 
subjects play a distribute $10 dictator game. In Decision 2, subjects can sort out of the $10 dictator 
game, and be paid $10 (with the other subject getting $0), or sort in and play the distribute $10 
                                                 
32 In sessions run in Barcelona the pie was €10 while sessions in Berkeley used a $10 pie. The text of the paper uses 
the subject decision task description as an assignment to “divide $10 (€10)” while the subject instructions use the 
wording “distribute $10 (€10)”. 
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dictator game. In other decision tasks, subjects can sort out of a $S dictator game, and be paid $10 
(with the other subject getting $0), or sort in and play the distribute $S dictator game. Values of S 
varied from 10.50 to 20.33    
 Explaining behavior of subjects in Experiment 2 who sorted into a S > 10 dictator game 
and kept more than 10 for themselves is straightforward. A more interesting behavior is that many 
subjects sorted out, and were paid 10, when they could have sorted into a S > 10 dictator game and 
retained more than 10 for themselves (and/or more than 0 for the other). For example, in the S = 
11 game, the outside option pays (dictator, other) payoffs (10,0) whereas Pareto-dominating 
payoffs such as (11,0), (10.50, 0.50) and (10,1) are available to a subject who sorts into the dictator 
game. The reluctant/willing sharers model developed by Lazear et al. (2012) is consistent with 
behavior patterns in the experiment. That model is a utility function with three arguments: own 
payoff, other’s payoff, and a binary indicator variable with value 1 for the sharing (dictator game) 
environment and value 0 for the non-sharing (outside option) environment. This type of behavior 
is also consistent with our moral cost model in which choosing the outside option allows the 
decision maker to avoid moral costs from making the sharing decision whereas choosing to play 
the game involves this cost, as we now explain.   
A subject has the right to choose the ordered pair of payoffs (10,0) by sorting out. This 
provides a clear endowment for the two-step game that includes the option of sorting in and paying 
the moral cost of making a sharing decision. Let jS  denote that amount of money that can be 
distributed in treatment j . Since the dictator’s sharing options include 0 and jS , the minimal 
expectations point for the two-stage game is the natural origin. Hence the moral reference point if 
the player sorts in is 1 2( , )r r =
1
2
( 10,0) . Let preferences consistent with MMA be represented by 
a utility function 1 2( , )u m r y r  . Substituting the budget constraint jm S y   and the moral 
reference point (5,0) the decision problem for our agent becomes max ( 5, )y ju S y y  . The MMA 
model is consistent with behavior by an agent who chooses the (10,0) outside option rather than 
sorting in to play a distribute S > 10 dictator game with feasible payoffs that Pareto-dominate 
(10,0) contained in its budget set.  
 Here we provide an example using a simple utility function, ( , )u m y m y  . By sorting 
out, a subject can avoid the moral cost of making the sharing decision, obtain payoff allocation 
                                                 
33 The experiment included anonymity and no-anonymity treatments.   
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(10,0), and utility 
 V (out) =10+q ´0.
 If the player sorts in then she incurs moral cost of making 
the sharing decision, instantiated in the model by the moral reference point 1 2( , ) (5,0)r r   and 
MMA. The decision-maker’s optimization problem for the dictator game is 
[0, ] 1 2 [0, ]max ( , ) max ( 5 )y S y Su m r y r S y y       . 
The optimal choice is 
2 / 4oy   and the value of sorting in is 
 V (in) = S -5+q
2 / 4. Comparing 
it to the value of sorting out, ( ) 10V out  , one has: 
1. Any agent with (*) 
2 4(15 )S   prefers sorting out and realizing payoff (10,0) to sorting 
in and being able to choose Pareto-dominating payoffs.   
2.  As S increases, inequality 
25 / 4 10S      becomes more likely to be satisfied and 
therefore the fraction of subjects sorting in increases, as observed in Experiment 2.  
 
 Experiment 1 in Lazear et al. (2012) is a between-subjects design in which one group of 
subjects play a distribute $10 dictator game and another group of subjects can sort out of the $10 
dictator game, and be paid $10, or sort in and play the distribute $10 dictator game.  The extended 
game with the outside option is modeled as above with the MMA model using the unambiguous 
(10,0) endowment provided by the outside option. The distribute $10 dictator game without outside 
options is a commonly used protocol for dictator games in which neither the dictator nor the 
recipient has a clearly assigned property right. This form of dictator game protocol is widely 
viewed as appropriate for research on sharing behavior but it does have an ambiguous endowment, 
as explained by Hoffman et al. (1994) and Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996).34  Experiment 1 
data are consistent with predictions from the MMA model which follow from interpreting the 10 
available for distribution as endowments to the dictator and recipient of   (10 , )z z , with 0z  .   
 
6.  IMPLICATIONS OF MMA FOR PLAY IN STRATEGIC GAMES WITH 
CONTRACTIONS 
 
We next extend our discussion to illustrate the implications of MMA for play of strategic games 
involving contractions. Games that have been studied in previous literature include: (1) the 
moonlighting game and its contraction, the investment game, (2) carrot and stick games and a 
contraction in the positive domain (carrot game) as well as a contraction in the negative domain, 
                                                 
34 The exact wording in the Hoffmann et al. subject instructions is “divide $10”.   The exact wording in the Lazear, 
et al. subject instructions is “distribute the $10 (€10)” although the text uses the wording “divide $10 (€10)”. 
31 
 
(stick game). Together with dictator games, these games have been widely used in the literature to 
measure different aspects of social behaviors, including trust and cooperation. MMA has different 
implications for play of these games than does Property   or a stronger traditional assumption 
such as convex preferences.  
 
6.1 Investment and Moonlighting Games 
The investment game (Berg, et al. 1995, and hundreds of other papers) can be constructed from 
the moonlighting game (Abbink, et al. 2000, and scores of other papers) by contracting the feasible 
choice sets of the first and second movers.35 Property   and MMA have different implications 
regarding the effects of such contractions and allow a way to distinguish between the two models 
using observed choice.                   
First, we argue that, for any given positive amount received, the second mover’s (SM’s) 
choice is the same in the Moonlighting and Investment Games (with the same initial endowments). 
This is the prediction of Property α as well as MMA because the reference point for the SM 
opportunity sets is the same in the two games. 
Next, we argue that for any first mover (FM) who sends a non-negative amount in the 
moonlighting game, Property α requires that he choose the same amount to send in the Investment 
Game.  MMA, in contrast, requires him to choose a larger amount to send in the Investment Game.  
The reason for this difference is that the moral reference point for the FM opportunity set is more 
favorable to the FM in the moonlighting game than in the investment game. 
An implication of the two statements is that MMA predicts more money being sent by all 
FMs in the investment game than in the moonlighting game whereas Property α makes this 
prediction only for FMs who take in the moonlighting game. Yet it is important to note that this 
latter “prediction” results solely from the constraint that prevents taking in the investment game, 
not from agent preferences in and of themselves.  
Let e denote the endowment of each FM and each SM. The amount sent by the FM is 
denoted by s. If s is positive it is multiplied by k >1 to obtain the amount received by the SM. 
Taking is not feasible in the investment game. In the moonlighting game, if s is negative then the 
                                                 
35 In the standard moonlighting game, the first and second mover are each endowed with equal amounts of money. 
The first mover can either give money or take money from the second mover, where the maximum amount that can 
be given is the full endowment but the maximum amount that can be taken is part of the endowment. Money given is 
transformed by a multiplier greater than 1 but money taken is not transformed. After the second mover learns about 
the outcome, he/she can also give or take money from the first mover at some cost. The investment game differs 
primarily in that the first mover can only give and not take.  
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multiplier is 1 to obtain the amount taken from the SM. The amount returned by the SM is denoted 
by r. Returning a negative amount is not feasible in the investment game. In the moonlighting 
game, when r is negative it costs the SM r/k to take r from the FM.    
SM opportunity sets across the two games: Let the SM be in information set 
 
M
s
 for some 
non-negative amount s  sent by the FM in the moonlighting game. The 
 
M
s
 set consists of options 
that are costly for the SM but can increase/decrease FM’s monetary payoff: 
 
M
s
= M
s
+ È M
s
-
  
where 
 
M
s
+ = (e- s+ r,e+ ks- r) : r Î[0,ks]{ }
M
s
- = (e- s+ r,e+ ks+ r / k) : r Î[-(e- s) / k,0){ }
 
Consider the SM’s choice in 
 
M
s
 in the Moonlighting Game when the FM sends a non-negative 
amount. Consistent with observed behavior36 (as well as Pareto efficiency), the amount returned 
will be from sM

.   
What are Property α and MMA predictions for SM’s choice in the investment game, at 
information set 
 
I
s
given the same nonnegative s?  In the investment game the SM’s choices can 
only increase the FM’s monetary payoff by decreasing own monetary payoff,  
 
I
s
= (e- s+ r,e+ ks- r) : r Î[0,ks]{ }  
Thus 
 
I
s
= M
s
+ Ì M
s
. Property α requires the same 
 
r
s
ÎM
s
+
 to be the SM’s choice in the 
investment game. This is also the MMA prediction because sets
 
M
s
 and 
 
I
s
 have the same moral 
reference point, with coordinate e s  for the FM and / 2e ks  for the SM. 
FM choices across the two games: In the moonlighting game, the FM can send money to 
the SM or take up to one-half of the SM’s initial endowment. Any positive amount sent (s > 0) is 
multiplied by k > 1.  Any amount taken (s < 0) is not transformed (it is one for one). The FM 
choice set is  M = M
+È M -  where 
 
 
M + ={(e- s,e+ ks) : sÎ[0,e]}
M - ={(e- s,e+ s) : sÎ[-e / 2,0)}
  
Suppose that the FM’s choice in the moonlighting game is some non-negative 
 
s
M
. In the 
investment game, the FM can only send money to the SM. The FM choice set is  
                                                 
36 Only 2 (out of 46) second movers who did not have money taken from them by first movers choose .s sr M
  
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 I ={(e- s,e+ ks) : sÎ[0,e]}
 
Thus, 
 
I = M + Ì M. 
Property α requires the non-negative amount 
 
s
M
 to be the FM’s choice in the investment 
game when it is the choice in the moonlighting game because the feasible set in the investment 
game is a contraction of the feasible set in the moonlighting game. In contrast, MMA implies that 
the FM will send more in the investment game because the moral reference point, (FM coordinate, 
SM coordinate) = ( / 2, )e e  in set I is more favorable to the SM than is the moral reference point  
( / 2, / 2)e e  in set M.    
Implications for game play: Both Property   and MMA imply that for any positive amount 
received the SM’s choices in the moonlighting and investment games are identical. We distinguish 
between two types of FMs: the ones who send in the moonlighting game and the ones who take. 
For a FM who takes in the moonlighting game, by design of the two games the FM must send 
more in the investment game. For a FM who does not take in the moonlighting game, we have 
shown above that Property α predicts the same amount being sent in the two games whereas MMA 
predicts a larger amount being sent in the investment game.  
Existing data that provide empirical support for MMA: We have analyzed data from an 
investment game experiment reported in Cox (2004) and a moonlighting game experiment 
reported in Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj (2008). These two experiments used the same initial 
endowments (10,10),e   the same multiplier k  (=3) and were run by the same experimenter. Data 
from these experiments are consistent with the implications of MMA and inconsistent with the 
implications of Property  , as follows.     
We have data from 64 subjects who participated in the investment game and 130 
subjects (66 within-subjects design and 64 between-subjects design) who participated in the 
moonlighting game. 
FM choices: Using only FM data with non-negative sent, we find that the means of the 
amounts sent are 5.97 (IG) and 4 (MG) and significantly different (t-test: one-sided p-value= 
0.013. 37  Therefore the FM data are consistent with the above implications of MMA but 
inconsistent with implications of Property .  
                                                 
37 If we look only at Send > 0, the mean figures are 7.35 (IG) and 4.84 (MG) and significantly different (t-test: one-
sided p-value=0.002). 
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SM choices: Estimates (standard errors in parentheses) of censored regressions for SM 
choices at information sets with “FM not taking” (send 0 , N=78 ) are38   
***( ) 0.67 ( 0.15) 0.41( 0.29) 0.23( 1.30)s M ME r s s D D            
Insignificance of the coefficients, DM and Ms D  for “Moon” and “Send*Moon” are consistent 
with the (same) implication of MMA and Property  , as discussed above.  
Taken jointly, we conclude that differences in play across the moonlighting and investment 
games are inconsistent with standard rational choice theory.  Changes in the first mover’s moral 
reference points across games leads to greater amounts shared in the investment game; a finding 
that is consistent with the predictions of MMA. 
 
6.2 Carrot, Stick, and Carrot/Stick Games 
Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003) look at effects of rewards and punishments on 
cooperation by studying behavior in three games: the carrot game that offers incentives only in 
terms of rewards, the Stick game that allows only for negative incentives (punishment) and the 
carrot and stick game (CS) that offers players both types of incentives. The two single incentive 
games are natural contractions of the CS game. We argue that for any given positive amount 
received the SM’s predicted choice is the same in the CS and carrot game. This is the prediction 
of Property α as well as MMA and arises as the moral reference point of the SM’s opportunity set 
is the same in the two games. Next, we argue that for any positive amount received the SM’s 
predicted choice is less malicious in the stick game than in the CS game according to MMA 
because the moral reference point in the stick game favors the SM.  
Let e = (240,0) in cents denote the endowments of the FM and the SM. The amount sent, s 
by the FM is the amount received by the SM and can take values from [40, 240] in all three games. 
The amount returned, sr  by the SM can be positive (carrot), negative (stick) or either (CS game) 
as returning a negative amount is not feasible in the carrot game whereas returning a positive 
amount is not feasible in the stick game. Regardless of the sign of the amount returned, the FM 
receives 5 sr .  
SM choices across the three games: For the amount s sent by the FM let the SM feasible sets be 
denoted by scsM  in the CS game, 
s
cM  in the carrot game and 
s
sM  in the stick game such that 
                                                 
38 Send > 0 (N=64): ***( ) 0.65 ( 0.17) 0.42( 0.36) 0.14( 1.87)s M ME r s s D D           
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s s s
cs c sM M M .  The 
s
csM  set consists of options that are all costly for the SM but can increase 
or decrease FM’s monetary payoff.  The sets are:   
 
 
 
(240 5 , ) : [0, ]
(240 5 , ) : [max{ (240 ) / 5, },0]
s
c
s
s
M s r s r r s
M s r s r r s s
    
       
 
Let csr  be the SM’s choice in the CS game when the FM sends amount s. Property α and MMA 
predictions for SM’s choice when the FM sends amount s are as follows: 
a. Carrot game: In this game the SM’s choices can only increase the FM’s monetary payoff by 
decreasing own monetary payoff. Property α requires that if the SM choice in the CS game is 
positive, i.e. scs cr M  then it remains a most preferred return in the carrot game. This is also 
the MMA prediction because sets scsM  and 
s
cM  have the same moral reference point, 
 240 s as the FM coordinate and ( / 2)s as the SM coordinate. Andreoni et al. (2003, Figure 
6) find larger demand for rewards in the CS game than in the carrot game which is inconsistent 
with both Property α and MMA. 
b. Stick game: In this game the SM’s choices can only decrease the FM’s monetary payoff by 
decreasing own monetary payoff. Property α requires that if the SM’s most preferred choice 
in the CS game is to reduce the FM’s monetary payoff, i.e., cs s
sr M  then it remains a most 
preferred return in the stick game. MMA, however, predicts in the stick game a smaller return 
in absolute value because the moral reference point favors the SM as its coordinate is s  (rather 
than / 2s ) whereas the FM’s coordinate remains the same,  240 s .  Andreoni et al. (2003, 
Figure 5) report a result they characterize as “surprising” (pg. 898) that demand for 
punishment is larger in the CS game than in the stick game.  This result is predicted by MMA 
but is inconsistent with Property α. 
 
Taken in its totality, data from Andreoni et al. (2013) provides evidence inconsistent with 
standard rational choice theory and mixed support for MMA.  Importantly, however, MMA can 
rationalize a data pattern that Andreoni et al. (2013) label as surprising; that the demand for 
punishment is greater in the CS game than in the stick game.  As the moral reference point for the 
SM in the stick game is more favorable than in the CS game, this is precisely what one would 
expect under MMA.  
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7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
When faced with the opportunity to share resources with a stranger, when and why do we give? 
The dictator game has emerged as a key data generator to provide researchers with a simple 
approach for eliciting other-regarding preferences in a controlled setting. The game has worked 
well in the sense that we now understand giving behaviors at a much deeper level. What has been 
less well explored is whether received results violate the basic foundations of economic theory.  
Recent dictator game experiments reveal that choices of subjects in specific pairs of 
dictator games are inconsistent with convex preference theory (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008; 
Cappelen et al., 2013). But the designs of these experiments do not provide an empirical challenge 
to rational choice theory. We take this next step by designing an experiment that generates data to 
test the empirical implications of Property   that is central to the theory. We find data that are 
inconsistent with extant rational choice theory. Our experimental design and data suggest why, 
and how, rational choice theory needs to be extended to maintain consistency with our data 
patterns.  
In this spirit, we propose moral reference points as features of feasible sets and a moral 
monotonicity axiom (MMA). An implication of MMA is preservation of the contraction property 
of rational choice theory for feasible sets and subsets that have the same moral reference point. 
The moral reference points we propose are observable features of feasible sets, not subjective 
reference points that can be adjusted ex post to fit new data.   
Development of the MMA model was motivated by an initial objective of rationalizing 
otherwise-anomalous data from dictator games with giving and taking opportunities. The model, 
however, has more general applicability. We explain how it can rationalize data from other types 
of dictator games in the literature. More importantly, we explain how the model has implications 
for play of strategic games involving contractions of feasible sets that differ from implications of 
extant theory.   
The model and experimental data lead us to conclude that moral reference points play a 
major role in the decision to act generously. As a whole, these findings highlight the importance 
of revisiting standard models to explore the role of moral reference points in a broader array of 
choice settings. In the paper, we have briefly provided an explanation of how the theory our morel 
reference points is predictive of received findings in a range of economic games designed to elicit 
social and cooperation behaviors. In this manner, we view our results as having both positive and 
normative import. For empiricists and practitioners, the results herein provide an indication that 
moral costs can play an important role in welfare calculations and program evaluation.   
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics  
 
  Moral Reference 
Point 
Ave. Transfera 
(st. dev.)  
Ave. Final 
Payoffsb 
 
Nobs 
 
Inequality  
Give (23,3) 4.54 (2.96) (22.46, 7.54) 61 
Take (19,3) 4.19 (3.34) (22.81,  7.19) 81 
Symmetric (15,3) 6.12 (4.95) (20.88,  9.12) 82 
 
Equal  
Give (19,7) 2.65 (2.24) (20.35,  9.65) 66 
Take (15,7) 3.17 (2.88) (19.83, 10.17) 58 
Symmetric (11,7) 3.94 (3.52) (19.06, 10.94) 62 
 
Envy 
Give (15,11) 2.43 (1.65) (16.57, 13.43) 67 
Take (11,11) 2.06 (1.85) (16.94, 13.06) 69 
Symmetric (7,11) 2.64 (2.55) (16.36, 13.64) 66 
 
a. “Ave. Transfer” is the amount by which the average recipient’s payoff chosen by dictators 
exceeds the recipient’s minimum expectations payoff (standard deviations in parentheses). 
b. Final payoffs, with dictator payoff first followed by recipient payoff.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Consistency with Convexity, Property   and MMA 
 
Environments Data with Convex Preferences 
Predictions 
Data with Property   
Predictions  
 Convexity MMA Property   MMA 
Inequality 
 
    39.36 (94) 78.72.017 (94) 45.68 (81) 75.31 (81) 
Equal 
 
46.24 (93) 81.72.016 (93) 48.31 (89) 80.90.052  (89) 
Envy 
 
54.46 (101) 78.22  (101) 55.56 (99) 77.78 (99) 
All 46.88 (288) 79.51
.003 (288) 50.19 (269) 78.07.097 (269) 
 
Note: Entries are percentages of choices consistent with predictions by the model in a column. Number 
of subjects in brackets. Entries as superscripts are one-sided p-values (when <.1) for the Sign Test. To 
conduct the Sign Test, observations that are consistent with Property   are coded as 0, the ones that 
are consistent with MMA (but violate Property  ) are coded as 1, whereas observations that violate 
both (MMA and Property  ) are coded as -1.  
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Table 3. Tests for Effects of Recipient Moral Reference Dimension  
 
 
       
 
 
 
Table 4. Moral Reference Points and Transfers 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: MMA predicted sign in square brackets. Entries are average marginal effects (Hurdle Model) and coefficients 
(Tobit model). Standard errors (clustered at subject ID level) in parentheses. Demographics include gender, race, GPA, 
religion, major and study year. Low and upper bounds in regressions are 8 and 0. b *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Recipient’s 
Final Payoff 
 
1r =15 
 
1r =19 
 
1r =11 
2r  [+] 
 
0.674*** 
 
0.668*** 
 
0.415* 
 
0.391* 
 
0.330** 
 
0.328**  
(0.187) (0.186) (0.215) (0.221) (0.155) (0.151) 
 
Constant
 
 
6.145*** 
 
6.955*** 
 
6.435*** 
 
5.616*** 
 
8.620*** 
 
9.341***  
(1.548) (2.417) (1.143) (1.895) (1.480) (1.797) 
       
Demographics no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 207 207 147 147 131 131 
Log-likelihood -261.3 -258.3 -224.8 -221.4 -225.9 -219.4 
 
Notes: Entries are Tobit estimated coefficients. MMA predicted sign in square brackets.   Demographics include 
gender, race, GPA, religion, major and study year. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, **p<0.05, p*<0.1 
Dep. Variable Hurdle Model  Tobit  Model 
Transfer (1) (2) (1) (2) 
1r  [-] -0.058** -0.055** -0.098** -0.104** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.047) (0.047) 
2r  [-] -0.319*** -0.314*** -0.497*** -0.487*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.091) (0.090) 
Demographics no yes no yes 
Observations 612 612 612 612 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Feasible Sets: [B, C] for Give or Take, [A, C] for Symmetric 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure portrays the feasible allocations for each treatment and action set. Participants in the Give or Take 
action sets can choose from [B, C], while participants in the Symmetric action set can choose from [A, C]. Actual 
feasible choices are ordered pairs of integers on the line segments.   
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Figure 2. Histograms using Data from List (2007) and Bardsley (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: In the upper panel, Baseline refers to the standard dictator game in which dictators can choose to give $0 to $5 
to the receivers. The Take $1 refers to the dictator game in which the feasible set is augmented to allow taking $1 
from the recipient. In the lower panel, the Giving Game 2 refers to a standard dictator game in which dictators can 
choose to give $0 to $7 to receivers. Taking Game 2 refers to a game that is augmented to allow taking $2 from the 
recipient. 
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Figure 3. Example of Choice with non-Convex Preferences 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Histograms of ∆𝑷  (within subjects)  
 
Notes: ∆P is constructed as follows. Each subject made two choices and for each choice the final own payoff was 
calculated. If the subject made a choice in Take and one in Give action sets then  ∆P is payoff in Give minus payoff 
in Take. If the subject made one choice in Take and one choice in Symmetric actions sets then  ∆P  is payoff in Take 
minus payoff in Symmetric. Finally if the subject made one choice in Give and one choice in Symmetric actions sets 
then  ∆P  is payoff in Give minus payoff in Symmetric.  
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                Figure 5. MMA Implies WARP for the Andreoni and Miller Experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
   Figure 6. Endowments and Moral Reference Points for Korenok, et al. Treatments 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1 
Let f  belong to both 
*F and G . Consider any g  from *.G  As G and F have the same moral 
reference point, ,
g f
r r  MMA requires that  and  , i i i ig f g f i   . These inequalities can be 
simultaneously satisfied if and only if ,  g = f  i.e. f  belongs to *G which concludes the proof 
for Property M  . Note, though, that any choice g  in 
*G  must coincide with f , an implication 
of which is 
*G must be a singleton. So, if the intersection of 
*F  and G  is not empty then choices 
satisfy property M . 
 
Appendix B. Effect of Moral Reference Point on Transfers 
“Transfer” is defined as the amount by which the recipient’s payoff exceeds her minimum 
expectations payoff. In a Give treatment, the transfer is the amount the dictator gives to the 
recipient. In a Take treatment, the transfer is the amount the dictator does not taken from the 
recipient.  In all treatments, the dictator makes a choice of an amount to give or take that we here 
represent by a transfer, t T , where T=[0,16] in the Symmetric version (Envy, Equal and 
Inequality) and T=[0,8] in the Give/Take scenarios (Envy, Equal and Inequality). The feasible set 
is  
  0, | 30, ,X m y m y y y t t T       
where  ,m y  are dictator’s and recipient’s final monetary payoffs. Let e  and r  be the initial 
endowment and the moral reference point of set X, that is,   1 1
1
max
2
r m T e   and 2 0r y . If 
the dictator chooses t T  then the recipient’s and dictator’s final payoff are 2y t r   and 
1 230 30 ( )m y r r     . 
(Conventional) other-regarding preferences 39  Let  * * *,P m y  be the dictator’s most 
preferred allocation of $30. Then when the dictator faces a set X that contains 
*P , by Property 
the dictator’s choice of transfer ot  is such that *2
ot r y  . Thus, as 2r  increases, the most 
preferred transfer, 
ot  decreases for as long as the set X contains 
*,P  and it is 0 after that. Using 
utility representation terminology, let dictator’s preferences be represented by some concave, m-
increasing C1 function  ,u m y . The dictator’s decision problem is  
                                                 
39 Such preferences include inequality aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 1999), quasi-maxmin 
(Charness and Rabin 2002) or ego-centric altruism preferences (Cox and Sadiraj 2012).  
49 
 
  2 230 ,( , )t Tmax u r tu rm ty     
 
By concavity of  .u , the optimal ot  if from the interior of T solves     , 1,1 0.G t r u       
 Apply the implicit theorem to get 40     
2
2
, 0
o
o
r
t
sign sign G t r
r
 
  
   
and as  .G  does not  
(directly) depend on 1r  , 
1
0
ot
r



. Thus we have the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis  : The optimal transfer, ot  decreases in 2r  but is not affected by 1r  
 
MMA type of preferences Let dictator’s choice satisfy MMA and suppose that dictator’s choices 
can be recovered as a solution to the following maximization problem41  
   1 2 1 2( , ) 30 ,t Tu m r y r umax r r t t       
where ( )u   is a concave C1 function. Let rt  be the optimal transfer.  
By MMA, dictator’s optimal  payoff,  * 1 230
rm r r t      increases in  1r , i.e., 
*
1 1
1 0
rm t
r r
 
   
 
. It follows that, (*) 
1
0.
rt
r


     
Next, let    1 2, ( , ) 1,1F t r u m r y r      . By concavity, the optimal 
rt  (at the interior) 
solves  , 0rF t r  . To show that 
2
0
rt
r



 
use (*) and the implicit function theorem:  
2 2 1 1
.
r rt F F t
sign sign sign sign
r r r r
          
         
          
 
Thus we have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis MMA: The optimal transfer, 
rt  decreases in 2r  as well as in 1r  
                                                 
40 By concavity of  u(  ),    2 2 11 12 22, 2 1,1 0.     
o
rG t r u u u Q . 
41 One way to think about a dictator who is “socially” cautious is that he can claim social credits only for the transfer 
part, t rather than all recipient’s payoff, 2r t  (as the recipient gets 2r no matter what by the experimenter). If so then 
rather than the distribution of 30, the dictator’s problem is the distribution of 
 
(30- (r
2
+ r
1
)) between oneself and 
the other person. 
